This dominant assumption that underlines disclosure laws, namely that disclosees are rational actors, has already been questioned by opponents of disclosure laws. In particular, those opposed to disclosure laws theoretically argued that disclosees suffer from one serious cognitive constraint: bounded rationality. 8 More specifically, a typical disclosee is boundedly rational, 9 and is therefore cognitively incapable of reading and analyzing disclosures, which are normally too complex and ubiquitous. 10 In the same vein as existing theoretical behavioral criticism on disclosure laws, this Article empirically shows, for the first time, that disclosees may suffer from another serious cognitive limitation apart from bounded rationality: unrealistic optimism about disclosed risks.
11
Focusing as a case study on franchisees, who are often perceived as sophisticated and rational disclosees, 12 this Article empirically shows 10. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at S258-59 (" [D] isclosers pile so much information on readers that they cannot possibly cope with the burden of understanding and analyzing what they have read. These problems are intensified by the fact that people are often not literate enough, or schooled enough in the complexities of quite specialized decisions, to use the information profitably.").
11. that franchisees are, by their very nature, cognitively biased. 13 More concretely, the evidence presented in this Article strongly indicates that franchisees are unrealistically optimistic about the major risks disclosed under the federal franchise disclosure rule that governs the significant franchise industry. 14 The broad potential implications of our empirical results are twofold: first, the assumption that disclosees are rational is dubious, and second, disclosees, being unrealistically optimistic about disclosed risks, may discount risk-related information disclosed under disclosure laws. Our results hence cast significant doubts over the effectiveness of disclosure laws in protecting disclosees from prospective hazards.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides context by reviewing the underlining major implicit assumption of disclosure laws, namely that disclosees are rational actors. 15 Part III presents data and discuss the methodology for empirically testing our hypothesis whereby franchisees, the focus of our empirical case study, are unrealistically optimistic about disclosed risks. 16 Part IV discusses the normative implications of the empirical results. 17 
II. DISCLOSURE LAWS' RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION
One central goal of disclosure laws is to allow disclosees to assess the expected risks of a decision before making one. 18 For example, the purpose of the "Know Before You Owe" mortgage disclosure rule is to help consumers understand the key risks of the mortgage loan for which they are applying. 19 For that purpose, lenders must disclose the loan's key risks, such as payment penalties or increases to the mortgage loan balance. 20 Likewise, the purpose of the "Lead Disclosure Rule" is to ensure that home purchasers are aware of the risks of exposure to leadbased paint before buying an apartment.
21 Accordingly, the Lead Dislcosure Rule requires sellers to provide purchasers with a federally approved lead hazard information pamphlet. 22 Similarly, the purpose of the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") Mutual Fund Disclosure policy is to help mutual fund investors more easily obtain key information about mutual fund risks. 23 Accordingly, each fund must disclose the principal risks of investing in the fund, "including the risks to which the Fund's portfolio as a whole is subject and the circumstances reasonably likely to affect adversely the Fund's net asset value, yield, and total return." 24 Similarly, pre-abortion disclosure laws require physicians to inform women of the health risks associated with abortion and childbirth before performing an abortion, in order to allow women to assess these risks.
25
Another major example of a disclosure law that aims to allow disclosees to assess the expected risks of their decision, and on which this Article is focused, is the "Federal Franchise Rule." 26 Rule's goals is to allow prospective franchisees to assess the risk that their potential franchisor will terminate their franchise contract opportunistically. The risk of opportunistic termination can take one of two central forms: (1) franchisors may terminate the contract of an efficient franchisee, who fully complies with the contract, solely for the purpose of selling the latter's profitable unit to a new franchisee for higher franchise fees; 27 or (2) a franchisor may terminate the contract of an efficient franchisee simply to manage the successful unit himself.
28
In order to allow potential franchisees to assess the prospective risk of opportunistic termination by their franchisor, the Franchise Rule requires each franchisor to disclose the following information through a pre-contractual disclosure document entitled Franchise Disclosure Document ("FDD"). First, the franchisor must summarize the conditions under which it may terminate the franchise contract.
29 Specifically, if the franchisor has a right to terminate the contract at-will, it must disclose this right in a specified tabular format. 30 Second, the franchisor must disclose the history of civil litigations within the franchise system. 31 This information is intended to alert potential franchisees that a franchise system has been plagued by lawsuits of opportunistic termination practices. 32 Third, the FDD must disclose the annual number of franchisees previously terminated by the franchisor without compensation. 33 Fourth, the franchisor must disclose the contact information of former franchisees terminated by the franchisor. information is intended to allow prospective franchisees to investigate the causes of previous franchisee terminations, and use it to assess the prospective risks of future opportunistic termination by the franchisor.
35
A seminal implicit assumption that underlines disclosure lawswhich aim to allow disclosees to assess the expected risks of their decision-is that disclosees are inherently rational. 36 More specifically, disclosure laws assume that disclosees, as rational actors, are likely to read the risk-related information disclosed, systematically assess the disclosed risks, and freely choose whether to take these risks based on their internal risk preferences. 37 For example, in the context of the Franchise Rule, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") explains, that the Franchise Rule is based on the theory that an informed franchisee "can determine whether a franchise deal is in his or her best interest." 38 Moreover, the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the FTC explains that the Franchise Rule is "a cost-effective way to provide material information to prospective franchisees so they can assess the . . . potential financial risks involved in entering into a franchise relationship." 39 Given the assumption that franchisees can rationally (1999) ("The theory of disclosure assumes that if the business and financial condition of an enterprise are adequately and accurately disclosed in a publicly available document, then an investor can make an informed determination regarding whether to engage in the prospective transaction."); Willis, supra note 36, at 712 ("The law . . . assumes that borrowers will take the disclosures and freely choose a loan available in the market according to the borrower's own internal price and risk preferences.").
38 intended to allow potential franchisees to assess the expected risks of the offered franchise before making a purchasing decision.
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B. The Theoretical Hypothesis
Our hypothesis is that the rationality assumption that underlines the Franchise Rule is false. Particularly, we predict that franchisees are unrealistically optimistic about the specific risks that are disclosed in the FDD, as required by the Franchise Rule. Our hypothesis is based on existing empirical studies, which show that people, in various aspects of life, are unrealistically optimistic about general future risks. 51 Unrealistic optimism is broadly defined as the tendency of an individual to think that misfortunes will happen to the other, and not to oneself. 52 The concept of unrealistic optimism was first introduced in 1980 53 and has since been documented in over one thousand studies. 54 For example, individuals are unrealistically optimistic about their chances of suffering health problems, such as heart attacks or arthritis. 55 Smokers are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of lung cancer, heart disease, and emphysema. 56 Individuals are unrealistically optimistic regarding their likelihood of contracting HIV. 57 Women are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of getting breast cancer. 58 Men are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of getting prostate cancer. 59 Drivers are unrealistically optimistic about their driving risks. 60 Motorcyclists are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of being involved in a serious road accident. 61 College students are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of being involved in a traffic accident. 62 College students are optimistically biased about positive life events, such as liking their post-graduation job or owning their own home. 63 College students are also unrealistically optimistic about negative life events, such as having a drinking problem or being fired from a job. 64 Individuals are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of committing suicide or becoming addicted to drugs. 65 Students who experienced an earthquake are unrealistically optimistic, a couple of months after the earthquake, about their risk of being hurt in a natural disaster. 66 Novice bungee jumpers are unrealistically optimistic about their risk of injury. 67 Individuals who had recently applied for a marriage license are unrealistically optimistic about the longevity of their marriage. 68 Equally, empirical studies consistently show that business people, although often perceived as more sophisticated than non-business people, 69 are unrealistically optimistic as well. Entrepreneurs are unrealistically optimistic about their own odds for business success. 70 Similarly, entrepreneurs are unrealistically optimistic about the probability of their business surviving. 71 Within the field of franchising-the focus of our empirical case study-empirical studies indicate that franchisees are also unrealistically optimistic. For example, franchisees may be unrealistically optimistic about their potential profits, and the level of training and support provided by the franchisor. 72 Similarly, franchisees are unrealistically optimistic about the number of units they will develop in their territory within a certain time period. 73 Likewise, franchisees are unrealistically optimistic about their business capabilities to uncover and implement their own novel business alternatives, which compete with the ones provided by their experienced and knowledgeable franchisor. 74 Correspondingly, franchisees are optimistically biased about their sales volume. 75 Given the empirical evidence that people, including franchisees, are generally optimistic about the future, we predict that franchisees are specifically optimistic about the major risks disclosed by operation of the Franchise Rule.
C. Methodology
General
In order to assess whether franchisees are rational or unrealistically optimistic about risks disclosed under the Franchise Rule, we apply the "direct method" of analysis, 76 developed mainly by Professor Neil
Weinstein. 77 This method is the most popular empirical method for assessing unrealistic optimism and has been applied in hundreds of studies. 78 Under this method, representative individuals from a group "are required to make a comparative, quantitative response indicating the degree to which they are more or less likely to experience [a certain risk] than the average person." 79 If the individuals, as a whole, are rational, their overall mean of comparative risk judgments combined should equal the "average." 80 In other words, the average of all individual levels of risk indicated by the participants should be equal to the average risk in the group. Conversely, a significant tendency for the individuals' overall mean to be lower than "average" indicates unrealistic optimism on the part of the individuals, as a whole, because the mean risk of the group should be, by definition, "average." 81 The lower the mean, compared to the average, the greater the level of unrealistic optimism. 82 To illustrate, if all individuals claim that their chances of experiencing a problem are well below average, they clearly demonstrate, as a whole, unrealistic optimism. 
Participants
The Franchise Rule obligates every franchise chain to disclose the contact information of its current franchisees. 84 Since we decided, for logistical reasons, to conduct an email survey rather than a phone survey, we located all the franchise chains in the representative Entrepreneur Magazine's dataset 85 that disclose their franchisees' email addresses in their FDD, as opposed to their phone numbers. This process led to a sample of 1741 franchisees from twenty-six different franchise chains. 86 These chains are from heterogeneous business lines such as real estate, business services, health care, maintenance, education, vending, fitness, shipping, children's products and services, and fast food.
Out of 1741 email addresses, 118 were invalid. Of the emails sent to valid addresses, 878 were opened by the franchisees. We believe that unopened emails sent to valid addresses were sent to recipients' spam folders or were suspected as spam. Of the 878 emails that were opened, 205 franchisees (23.3%) filled out the research questionnaire. Franchisees who chose to participate in the study did so voluntarily, without any monetary or other compensation. Table 1 summarizes the franchisees' ages. 87 The ages ranged between 20 to 61 years and above: 2% of the franchisees in the sample were 20 to 30 years of age, 12.3% were 31 to 40, 23.0% were 41 to 50, 34.8% were 51 to 60, and 27.9% were 61 and over. The majority of the sample, 85.7%, were over 41 years of age. Table 2 summarizes the franchisees' experience in the franchise industry. 88 The experience ranged between less than 1 year to 16 years and above: 29.2% had 0 to 2 years of experience, 32.5% had 3 to 5 years, 18.9% had 6 to 10 years, 10.2% had 11 to 15 years, and 9.2% had 16 years of experience or more. More than half of the sample, 61.7%, had up to 5 years of experience. Table 3 summarizes the number of franchise units owned by each franchisee. 89 This number ranged from one unit to five units or more: 79.1% had only one franchise unit, 15.0% had two units, 1.5% had three units, 1.0% had four units, and 3.4% had five units or above. The vast majority of franchisees had only one franchise unit. 3. Instruments A questionnaire comprising five items was developed specifically for this study. Two items were used to assess unrealistic optimism by asking the franchisees to assess two potential risks addressed in the FDD, as provided to each franchisee under the Franchise Rule. More specifically, franchisees were asked to assess the likelihood-compared to other franchisees in their chain and state-that their franchisor might terminate a franchise unit that they own in order to resell it to someone else. Franchisees were also asked to assess the comparative likelihood that their franchisor might terminate a franchise unit that they own in order to operate it directly. Franchisees were asked to respond using a seven point Likert scale: much below average, below average, a little below average, average for a franchisee in my chain and state, a little above average, above average, and much above average. When analyzing the data, the seven possible responses were assigned numerical values ranging from (-3) to (+3) ("much below average" to "much above average," respectively). This response scale is typically used in studies that empirically investigate the incidence of unrealistic optimism.
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The remaining three items in the questionnaire were demographic questions: franchisees were asked to report their age ("How old are you?"), years of experience in the franchise industry ("How many years in total have you been a franchisee?"), and number of units owned ("How many franchise units do you own?").
Procedure
Franchisees were sent an email asking them to volunteer to participate in a study concerning franchisees' perceptions of specific business risks. The email contained a hyperlink navigating participants to an online version of the research questionnaire. Franchisees who did not complete the questionnaire received a reminder to participate in the study six days later. Table 4 presents the distribution of franchisee responses in percentages, as well as the mean and standard deviation, regarding their franchisor's intentions to resell the franchisee's unit or operate the unit directly. 91 As evident from the data concerning both potential risks, most of the franchisees believe that the likelihood of either scenario is much below average or below average. 
D. Results
General
Evidence of Unrealistic Optimism
The unrealistic optimism hypothesis was tested, namely, whether franchisees exhibit overconfidence in their judgments. If the comparative risk judgments in franchise businesses are unbiased, then the mean judgment will be zero for each risk. A mean less than zero indicates an optimistic bias, that is, a tendency to claim that one's risk is less than the risk of others (i.e., the average risk). Thus, the mean comparative risk judgment is a measure of unrealistic optimism: the more negative the mean, the greater the bias.
A one sample t-test of the hypothesis that the mean is different from zero revealed a significant unrealistic optimism bias, in each of the two risks: (1) the likelihood attributed by franchisees to the risk that their franchisor might terminate a franchise unit they own in order to resell it to someone else was significantly lower than zero, i.e. the average (M = -2.04, SD = 1. 66 
Unrealistic Optimism and Demographics
The franchisees' assessment of their franchisors' intentions to resell their unit was found to be uncorrelated with age (r = -.03, p = .635) or years of experience (r = -.04, p = .581). However, it was found to be correlated with the number of franchises owned (r = .16, p = .019); with a small effect size. That is, the more franchises a franchisee owns, the greater her assessment that her franchisor intends to resell a franchise unit that she owns.
The franchisees' assessment of their franchisors' intentions to operate the unit directly was found to be uncorrelated with years of experience (r = -.08, p = .284) or number of franchises owned (r = -.01, p = .959). However, it was found to be correlated with age (r = -.14, p = .044); with a small effect size. That is, the younger the franchisee, the greater her assessment that her franchisor intends to operate the unit directly.
The franchisees' assessments of their franchisors' intentions to either resell the unit or operate the unit directly were found to be correlated with one another (r = .63, p < .001); with a large effect size. That is, the less a franchisee believes that her franchisor intends to resell her unit, the less she believes that her franchisor intends to operate the unit directly.
Age was correlated to years of experience (r = .40, p < .001); with a medium effect size. That is, the older a franchisee, the more years of experience she tends to have. The number of franchises owned was uncorrelated to age (r = -.05, p = .490); or years of experience (r = .04, p = .553).
Two Risk Comparison
Although, as reported earlier, the relationship between the two items assessing overconfidence-the franchisees' assessment that their franchisor intends to resell their unit or operate the unit directly-was found to be significant with a large effect size (r = .63, p < .001), we wanted to compare the two items to see if franchisees showed greater optimism bias with respect to one risk over the other. To this end, we applied a paired samples t-test. We found the franchisees' overconfidence that their franchisors intend to operate the unit directly (M = -2.55, SD = 1.07) was significantly higher than their overconfidence that franchisors intend to resell the unit (M = -2.04, SD = 1.66; t [203] = 5.45, p < .001, d = 0.38); with a small effect size. That is, optimism bias was greater for franchisor intentions to operate the unit directly than for franchisor intentions to resell the unit, although the difference was small.
IV. DISCUSSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Our empirical study reveals that franchisees, often perceived as sophisticated and rational disclosees, 92 are inherently biased concerning disclosed risks. This discovery casts significant doubts over the underlining implicit assumption of the federal franchise disclosure rule, namely that franchisees are rational actors.
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In addition, our results, which show that franchisees are cognitively biased, question the effectiveness of the Federal Franchise Disclosure Rule. 94 More specifically, franchisees, being overly optimistic about disclosed risks, may simply avoid risk-related disclosure information that might contradict their optimistic beliefs. 95 "If [disclosees] perceive that particular negative events are less likely to happen to them then it is possible that they will pay less attention to risk-related [disclosure] information . . . ." 96 Disclosees who are unrealistically optimistic about their own abilities may not pay much attention to disclosure risk information, which they may feel is mainly directed at other less careful or less skillful individuals than themselves. 97 Indeed, empirical studies systematically show that people who are optimistically biased about their risks are less likely to seek information about those risks. For example, an empirical study by Anh, Park, and Haley examined the relationship between consumers' optimism bias and their inclination to read mandated legal disclosures. 98 By analyzing the survey data of 404 consumers, the study reveals that unrealistically optimistic consumers are less likely to pay attention to the mandated legal disclosure on the health risks of drugs, which is required by the biased subjects reported lower interest in the pamphlet than did the more realistic subjects.
V. CONCLUSION
A seminal assumption that underlies current disclosure laws is that disclosees are intrinsically rational. As such, disclosees are presumed to be able to rationally assess the risks involved in contracts and avoid those risks. Based on this rationality assumption, current disclosure laws are predominantly based on rules, which aim to provide disclosees with information regarding future risks. Equipped with this information, disclosees, as rational actors, are assumed to be capable of protecting themselves against future contractual risks.
This Article questions the validity of the assumption that disclosees are rational actors. As the empirical study in this Article shows, franchisees, despite being business people who make large investments in the franchise, suffer from an inherent cognitive constraint known as unrealistic optimism. Due to them being overly optimistic about the future, it is expected that franchisees would systematically discount riskrelated information disclosed under disclosure laws.
The broad potential implications of our empirical results are that other disclosees, less sophisticated than franchisees, are also likely to be unrealistically optimistic about disclosed risks. Our results, hence, cast significant doubts over the effectiveness of disclosure laws in protecting disclosees from prospective hazards.
